Beena Sarwar

Just over a year ago, Salmaan Taseer, governor of Pakistan’s largest province, the Punjab, was assassinated in the most cowardly manner by a government-assigned security guard in federal capital, Islamabad. The killer, a trained commando of the Punjab Elite Force, Mumtaz Qadri, pumped 27 bullets into the Governor’s back as he headed to his car on the afternoon of January 4, 2012.

This sensational murder that rocked the nation and reverberated around the world was not a spontaneous enraged act but a well-thought out, cold-blooded plan. One man executed this plan – but was he acting alone and was it an act motivated only by ‘religious fervour’ as has been depicted or is there more to the issue than meets the eye? And even if the action was purely altruistic, should the law of the land not be applied to punish the guilty?

The Governor was already a target of those whom he termed as ‘hate-filled organisations’ well before they saw an opportunity to (mis)use the ‘blasphemy law’ and the Aasia Bibi case to unite their own until then divided ranks.

To do this, they needed a target. They found it first in Aasia Bibi, the Christian woman whom a trial court sentenced to death on Nov 8, 2010, for ‘blasphemy’, and then in a much bigger and more prominent figure, Salmaan Taseer, who publicly championed her cause.

Let’s rewind further back to put this situation in context. In Feb 2008, a democratically elected government came into power, replacing Gen. Musharraf’s military regime. Policy changes began to be visible. It was no longer a one-man rule. There was a Parliament through which policy matters had to be routed. The new government began completing Gen. Musharraf’s half-hearted ‘u-turn’ against the Taliban, opposed by the security establishment that still sticks to the outdated paradigm of ‘strategic’ depth – a continued influence in Afghanistan because of a perceived threat from India.

Pakistan was the last country to end diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (it was one of only three countries to recognise that regime in the first place, along with UAE and Saudi Arabia). Gen. Musharraf’s policy of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds essentially meant that while Pakistan officially withdrew support from the Taliban after 9/11, it continued to turn a blind eye (and covertly support) the ‘home grown jihadis’ that it saw as useful to keep the fire smouldering in Indian administered Kashmir.

What does all this have to do with Salmaan Taseer and the politics behind his assassination? Everything. This mindset and political ideology disguised in the rhetoric of religion, is furthered and jealously guarded by a security establishment that sees its duty as being to guard not just Pakistan’s physical frontiers but also the so-called ‘ ‘ideology of Pakistan’, fashioned along conservative religious lines particularly since the 1965 war with India.

The third military ruler, Gen. Ziaul Haq (r 1977-88) firmed up this ‘ideology’ in cahoots with his American masters. Together they converted a national war of liberation in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion, into a ‘jihad’ or ‘holy war’, promoting the concept of ‘jihad international’ in modern times, as Dr Eqbal Ahmad pointed out in his talk on ‘Terrorism, theirs and ours’ (1998).

Pakistan’s home-grown ‘religious’ organisations, which had flourished and gained immeasurable strength, pumped up with Saudi and American dollars, arms and training during the Zia years continued to flourish and function freely during the military-dominated decade of musical chairs democracy (1988-1999) in which no democratically elected government was allowed to complete its tenure. Their powers and privileges continued unabated during the Musharraf years (1999-2008) although the General’s u-turn following pressure from Washington after the events of September 11, 2001, meant that their activities had to be less visible.

Their rage at being demoted from blue-eyed boys to pariahs began spilling over after an elected government replaced the Musharraf regime and even covert government support for them ended. The genie released during the Zia years that had grown so big during Musharraf’s time was not going to go tamely back into the bottle. It had turned into a multi-headed monster with no central command. Thousands of these trained, armed, ideologically indoctrinated men, easily incited and ready to kill for their cause, were, and are, on Pakistan’s soil.

Governor Taseer was already in their sights for his outspoken and rational views on religion, human rights and justice (as opposed to the emotional ones of the ‘Taliban ideology’). In May 2010, after armed men opened fire on worshippers in an Ahmedi mosque in Lahore, killing over 80 people and injuring scores of others, Governor Salmaan Taseer went to give his condolences to them.

The elected parliament under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1974 had declared that Ahmedis to be non-Muslim (a shameful capitulation to the mullah lobby). A decade later, in 1984, more amendments under Gen. Zia’s military regime criminalised their status, making them liable to be prosecuted for matters like using Muslim greetings or Islamic terms, in short, ‘pretending’ to be Muslim, which has come to mean ‘blasphemous’. The Taliban ideology takes this thread forward, seeing Ahmedis as heretics (kafir) and liable to be killed. The adherents of this ideology have conflated these issues with so much success that many people actually think that these views are in accordance with Islam. Few people dare to publicly argue with the rhetoric that is whipped up on these grounds – and those who do, risk becoming targets as well. Even Islamic scholars who provide a rational counterpoint based on the Quran are targeted. Several have been killed, and others have had to lie low or go into self-exile.

Yet, during his condolence visit, in front of dozens of television cameras, Salmaan Taseer clearly and boldly countered this warped view – a video of the visit is available here. He stated that in his view and in his party’s view, Ahmedis are ‘noble, patriotic’ Pakistanis. He not only agreed that there was a need to correct past wrongs but he openly named “these hate-filled organisations – Sipah-e-Sahaba, (Lashkar-e-) Jhangvi,” that, he said, “all have same ideology – Taliban, Al Qaeda… They should be prosecuted in the courts; don’t let them off. There should be zero tolerance towards them.”

He also took a dig at the provincial Punjab government, hinting at their hobnobbing with these groups – “No political alliance is possible with these organisations, you can’t go around having them at your political meetings, the Punjab government should prosecute them”.

It was barely months later that the religious parties started raising the ‘blasphemy’ issue, conflating it with the issue of the ‘honour of the Prophet, peace be upon Him’. Walk chalkings proclaimed: ‘hurmat-e-Rasool par jaan bhi qurbaan hai’ (for the honour of the Prophet lives can be sacrificed).

The Aasia Bibi case exploded in November 2010 – over a year after she had been arrested and the case registered, three days after the alleged incident took place in which during an argument with some fellow villagers, she uttered ‘blasphemous’ words. A decade or so ago, a ‘low caste’ woman (as most Christians in the Punjab are considered to be, being descendent of converts from a low caste during the British Raj), would not have argued back as Aasia reportedly did. The fact that the case, like most blasphemy cases, was registered days after the alleged incident also indicates a political motivation. As in other such cases, elements from the religio-political parties appear to have used the opportunity to ‘work’ on the other women, to invoke religious fervour and convince them to register a case.

This was the first ‘blasphemy’ case in many years in which a court handed down a death sentence to an accused – and the first time such a sentence was awarded to a woman. Protests against the sentence by human rights and Christian organisations led to counter protests by ‘Islamic’ groups that used the issue to build up their political strength.

The situation was reminiscent of the early 1990s when several ‘blasphemy’ cases were registered, and the first ‘blasphemy murder’ was committed. Since then, although the lower courts have occasionally handed down death sentences, country’s higher courts have acquitted the accused. Pakistan has never carried out a ‘blasphemy execution’ although several men have been extra-judicially killed after being accused of ‘blasphemy’.

The frenzied propaganda built up against Salmaan Taseer was amplified umpteen times in 2010 because of the reach of the electronic media by now. Many in the 24/7 news media, keen for a sensational story to boost their ratings, jumped into the fray. Taseer was projected in the public domain as a blasphemer. In one particularly vitriolic television talk show, the anchor, known for her high-pitched approach, put him in the dock, taking him aback – not an easy thing to do. “Bibi, you are acting as I have committed some blasphemy,” he reprimanded her, but she continued her tirade. (watch the programme here and here)

Meanwhile, Sunni Tehrik and other extremist organisations were holding rallies and demonstrations calling for the blood of blasphemers. Mumtaz Qadri was a known figure at such rallies where emotions were being whipped into frenzy. He even recited ‘naat’ [poetic rendition in praise of Prophet Muhammad] at some of them – like at this one, just three days before he killed the man he was supposed to be protecting.

The question arises how, especially in such an atmosphere, a man who was attending such gatherings, who was already known for his extremist views – and had been earlier removed from police’s Special Branch because he was perceived as a security threat – was inducted into the Elite Force in the first place? Secondly, how was such a man assigned guard duty to a high profile target like the Governor Punjab? And thirdly, “why did the other guards not open fire, as per standard operating procedures in VIP guard duty? (In Qadri’s confession after his arrest, he said that he had told his colleagues what he was going to do and asked them not to open fire, as he would surrender.)”

Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of several professional and activist organisations formed on Dec 19, 2010 in Karachi, raised these and other questions in its statement of January 7, 2011, that “indicate the involvement of retrogressive forces in Pakistan that have over the past couple of decades made inroads into all sections of society and institutions of the state, including those institutions upon which Pakistani citizens rely for their security.”

Salmaan Taseer’s murder was followed barely a couple of months later by the murder of the Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian by faith, who had also been speaking out about the blasphemy issue. No one has been arrested for that murder, and trial court judge who sentenced Mumtaz Qadri to death has had to leave the country for his own safety.

The question many are asking (but not too loudly) is that if Qadri is willing to die for his faith and he believes he has done right, why are his supporters calling for the death sentence to be commuted? On Jan 4, 2012, at a gathering to ‘celebrate’ the anniversary of Governor Taseer’s assassination, the Sunni Ittehad Council, a religious umbrella organisation, was ready to pay Rs100 million [over a million US dollars] for the “holy gun” that Qadri had used for the murder.

“Presumably that the gun is currently held in an evidence bag. Why not petition for the police to complete whatever ballistic tests are needed and for the court to hand the gun back to the government, who own it,” suggests one analyst asking not to be named. “The government can then sell it to the Sunni Council for Rs 100 million. The money will then not be in the pocket of the Sunni Council, and can be spent on things like rehabilitation of victims of extremist violence. And if they do not pay up, they will have been exposed as hypocrites, again.”

So there are two urgent needs in Pakistan now, aside from the perennial ones of clean drinking water, healthcare, education, shelter and so on. These urgent needs are: to enforce the rule of law (charge, try and prosecute the guilty without fear or favour), and to expose the hypocrisy of the Taliban mentality.

Published in IVP

Filed under: Pakistan Tagged: Afghanistan, Asia Bibi, Fundamentalism, Musharaf, Salmaan Taseer, Taliban ]]> http://daniellesabai1.wordpress.com/2012/01/10/salmaan-taseer-the-political-context-of-a-religious-assassination/feed/ 0 daniellesabai pakistan1 http://daniellesabai1.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/china-studies-marxism-twelve-pro-capitalist-lines-reflections-after-a-voyage/ http://daniellesabai1.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/china-studies-marxism-twelve-pro-capitalist-lines-reflections-after-a-voyage/#comments Sun, 20 Nov 2011 08:34:10 +0000 daniellesabai http://daniellesabai1.wordpress.com/?p=1016 ]]> Ian Parker

Capitalism in China is rapidly uprooting and throwing into the market-place all that seemed fixed and fast frozen since the revolution in 1949 but, as with all other forms of capitalism, this market is all but free. The bureaucracy holds in place systems of authority necessary for capital accumulation, and the Chinese state is a key player in the enrichment of a new bourgeoisie. There are particular political-economic and ideological conditions for this transition, of course, and one of the most important is the legacy of Maoism, and how the claim to be a socialist country is squared with the rapid abandonment of each and every tenet of socialism.

One obstacle that must be overcome, then, is the existence of Marxism as an ideological resource. Even as a distorted form of Marxism derived from Stalinist practice in the Soviet Union and adapted to local conditions by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there are contradictions and space for resistance to class rule that pose dangers to the bureaucracy and to the new entrepreneurs. So where is ‘Marxism’ in China now?

The Third International Conference on Contemporary Capitalism in October 2011 at Hangzhou Normal University was jointly organised by the Centre for Marxist Social Theory at Nanjing University, the Department of Philosophy and School of Marxism at Nanjing University and the Centre for Marxist Studies at Hangzhou Normal University. The first two conferences were held in Nanjing, and for this one many the participants travelled south for this meeting. There are 70 participants in the group photo taken on the first day, including four Westerners; Neil Harding (not a Marxist but a ‘Leninologist’ now retired from Swansea University), Lois Holzman who is now effectively leader of the New York based Newman psycho-political group (formerly Maoist), David McNally a political theorist from York University in Toronto (and activist with the New Socialist Group), and myself (among other things, and the reason I was invited it seems, critical psychologist and Lacanian psychoanalyst). There were a few participants from Taiwan, an increasingly significant trade link with the mainland (especially so, the local press reported, given the increasing economic connections between South Korea and the United States), and, of course, from Beijing. The final session included a demagogic ‘and now after you have had your fun remember this’ kind of address from a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences flown down from the capital.

Formal introductions at the beginning of the conference, including welcome from the secretary of the CCP local committee, were followed by the real business, which was how to connect Marxist theory with capitalism today. Or rather, it quickly became clear that the task was how to speak about Marxism in such a way as to validate current government policies and to damn economic competitors. Overall, the conference was a site for rehearsing different possible permutations of arguments for the Chinese state and ‘contemporary capitalism’ without actually mentioning that capitalism is well and truly entrenched here. These were the main intersecting lines of argument (12 lines at least) spun out in different ways across the two days.

Probably most important (line 1) as the overall frame for all the other moves, was an argument characterised by a rather significant absence rather than a presence, which is the line that you must never directly refer to Maoism, let alone engage in a critique of Mao, as one of the forms of Marxism (neither should you directly refer to, or critique, Chinese capitalism). Discourse at the conference swerved around these issues, and never addressed questions of one-party rule, the existence of free-trade zones providing cheap labour for the West (or the suicides in factories run for the production of Apple goods in Shenzhen, for example), let alone environmental destruction as rural populations are uprooted to make way for industrial developments. Response to questions about these things raised informally outside the conference sessions was a blank smile and an attempt to change the subject, or hurt complaint that the Chinese were being picked on. There was one exception that proved the rule, which was a statement by a Chinese participant that capitalism in China would run into crisis and would eventually collapse. I learnt afterwards that he had said this, for during the actual presentation these comments by him were not translated.

Alongside the first line as a key institutional function of this kind of conference, was the argument (line 2) that ’Marxisms’ of great diversity should be rolled out for inspection so that it became unclear what could actually define Marxism as such. It was only the use of the word ‘Marxism’ (rather than the link between interpretation and revolutionary practice) that brought these various accounts together. It was possible to find some family resemblances among these different accounts, but these were detached from the real world, turned into academic theory, fodder for more academic debate. The Centre for Studies in Marxist Social Theory at Nanjing University (which I visited after the conference, and where they politely listened to me speak about Marxism, Stalinism, Žižek and psychoanalysis) had photos up on the walls of figures from ‘Western Marxism’ in the very broadest sense (Horkheimer, Sartre, Baudrillard and Foucault among them). One of the translators was doing their doctoral studies on Deleuze. I was told by one student that interest in Western Marxism was mainly focussed on the ‘Western’ bit of it.

One strong theme (line 3) was that we should understand what was referred to as ’American values’ in order to posit ’Chinese values’ as a supposedly progressive counterpoint. A paper on this topic was first up in the conference, and voiced a strong underlying assumption that the values of individual freedom and so on were shared by everyone living in the US. My objection that there was a counter-tradition of collective resistance and class solidarity which were also ‘American values’ was met with the statement that the President of the United States speaks for all citizens of his country and should be taken as representative. We will come to the smoothing out of class conflict in China in a moment, but this was the worst of homogenising sociological banalities in place of anything that might claim to be a Marxist analysis.

What was called ’democracy’ was portrayed as something particular to ’Western capitalism’, and so as not applicable to China (line 4). An editorial in the 21 October issue of Global Times, an English-language Party mouthpiece, for example, claimed that the Arab Spring had now given way to disenchantment with democracy, and recognition even in the West that democracy was failing. Democracy was defined there as a reduction to the individual and to a battle between different interests. The previous day’s edition included a cartoon of Gilad Shalit waving an Israeli flag celebrating his release in the foreground while behind him in distance missiles were looming over the horizon. The image and caption, ‘Dangerous Trade’, would not have been out of place in the Zionist press.

Another favourite strategy (line 5) was to churn through different readings of Marx by other scholars and declare that they do not work. In many cases at the conference the theories were also mangled beyond recognition (which made the job of the translators very difficult, and occasionally led them into fits of giggles as they whispered their attempts to make sense of what was being said to us and admitted that it did not actually make sense in Chinese). Alongside this (line 6) was the insistence on specifically attacking Hegelian readings of Marx as ’useless, of course’, and so to dispense with anything of the dialectic. Then there was the argument (line 7) that Marx’s account was based on capitalism in Europe, and therefore was not valid in China. So, what should be made of reports that Liang Wengen, a billionaire (and number 114 in the Forbes List of the world’s richest men), will be made a member of the Central Committee of the Party in 2012 (something Global Times proudly reported in September this year)? The answer is that he is still working class, but an extraordinarily rich worker. In China, I was told, you need to recognise that there is no class contradiction because there are no competing classes. Discontent can be interpreted as a function of ‘ren min nei bu mao dun’ (internal friendly contradiction of those with a common purpose).

Some speakers were keen to take up some critiques of capitalism in the West (line 8), and to point out that they might apply in China. One example was the use of Debord’s situationist critique of capitalism as a ‘spectacle’ in which everything is turned into a commodity and any connection with real economic interests is lost (and this was where Baudrillard and some of Žižek’s work was popular). However, a crucial part of the argument here was that these critiques should then be seen as sad failings rather than structural features of capitalism in China. Then there were attempts (line 9) to use Marxist critique to bemoan particular degenerate aspects of Western capitalism that have started to enter China. Here there were references, for example, to ’the bankruptcy of everyday life’, something that steered a little too close, for some at the conference, to political critique. With the exception of Zhang Yibin (executive Vice-Chancellor of Nanjing University, head of the Marxist Institute and prominent Party member), no members of the Institute combined their academic work with politics of any kind at all. It was necessary, I was told, to make a choice between the two.

There were plenty of attempts (line 10) to clarify what ’Western thought’ (that is, capitalism) and ’Marxism’ are so that they can be ’integrated’ with what was called the ’Chinese tradition’ (which boiled down mostly to a reverence for Confucian themes of respect for elders and betters). This is where the ideological struggle to rearticulate Sun Yat-sen as founder of the Chinese Republic in 1912 (and of the Kuomintang) gets tangled in and then subordinated to the three key motifs marked on his mausoleum in Nanjing. Motifs of ‘Nation’, ‘Livelihood’ and ‘Civil Rights’ have been claimed for years by the Kuomintang leaders who fled to Taiwan as integral to bourgeois law and order. The CCP is now playing the same game, and ‘Marxism’ in the process is sharply differentiated from what is seen as mere ‘leftism’. We were told that in order to understand Marxism in China, it would be necessary to ’Sinitise’ it (which sounds very much like ’sanitise’, but means to turn it into something Chinese), and this means (line 11) making it compatible with Confucianism (and all the old feudal baggage of respect for the family and strong leadership).

Outside the conference I heard some even more bizarre things. For example, I was told that the old Chinese written character for ‘party’ which was initially adopted by the CCP (before a more modern version of script was instituted) meant, if read literally, ‘in favour of darkness’. In fact, it is true that the character still on the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum in Nanjing has these two elements (‘in search of’ or ‘in favour of’ as the upper part of the written character, and ‘darkness’ or ‘blackness’ as the bottom part). This is something akin to conspiracy theories in the US which are fixated on freemasonry symbols on the Dollar Bill. I was told that television channels either broadcast boring news propaganda or trivial entertainment so that choice between the two was as between Orwell and Huxley (both of whom were on sale in the huge ‘Libraire Avant-Garde’ bookshop in Hangzhou).

There are two lingering questions that were unaddressed by the conference, two more significant absences that should have been tackled, but were not. The first is to do with the place class struggle. We have touched on this issue already, but it is worth emphasising that while there were references by the Western speakers to struggles around the world, such as in Mexico, Chile and in the Arab World, with the exception of mention of the Wall Street protests (where Žižek’s address to the activists in Zuccotti Park was described with approval) there were no references by the Chinese to such things. Nor were there any references by any of us, more importantly, to class struggle in China (or other kinds of resistance to the regime, of which there are many, ranging from factory strikes to local secessionist protests). This meant that the concrete question of the relevance of Marxism was not tested against particular movements. The second significant absence was the question of the role of Marxism, the meaning of Marxist accounts of class struggle, outside universities. We were a group of academics talking about such things, but whether such debates would have any resonance with movements outside the University was left unexplored. If Marxism is to be a theory and practice which simultaneously transforms its object (capitalism), then it should be connecting with the practice of actually-existing struggle.

The only images of Mao (apart from on the banknotes) were in tacky gift shops or in cultural revolution themed restaurants serving spicy food (a speciality of Shaoshan, where he was born) under signs which read ‘the Commune is our Eden’. But, again, this is a joke, and is tolerated on condition that that you can play as much as you like if you are clear that you do not take it seriously (line 12). I saw no images of Barack Obama in China, but I saw plenty more pictures of Steve Jobs than Chairman Mao.

We were as if inside an academic seaside zoo, and actually, if you remember that a version of Marxism was the guiding force in the revolution, quite a little one. Even though there has been a recent directive that Marxist Institutes be set up in all universities, The Centre for Studies of Marxist Social Theory at Nanjing as a leading example was pretty much confined to the seventh floor of the Philosophy department. There are, an editorial in the 26 October issue of China Daily noted, 16,383 psychotherapists and counsellors in China now, which is a lot more than the number of self-identified ‘Marxists’ with the right to speak about what Marxism is (and to neutralise and absorb it into the current pro-capitalist agenda of the CCP in the process). Meanwhile, ‘The World Zhejiang Entrepreneurs Convention’ was doing great business with many more participants than our meeting elsewhere in Hangzhou. Marxism in China is largely confined to ‘studies’ of Marxism, actively confined as an ideological exercise designed to confirm government policy. We were a little conference of ’Marxists’ who were efficiently contained as an exotic and archaic species engaged in academic debates, our energies drained, before we went.

Farooq Tariq

Several supporters and members of Labour Party Pakistan are locked up if different jails of Pakistan. 9 textile workers including Fazal Ilahi a leading member of LPP are in Faisalabad jail. 15 activists are in Gilgit jail including Baba Jan, en elected member of LPP Federal Committee. They are not terrorists. They are political activists. However, all of them are charged with anti terrorist laws.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said on 14^th November speaking at Mandi Bahuldin, that there are no political prisoners at this time in Pakistan. He was my university fellow, I am telling him that I know at least 24 members and supporters of Labour Party Pakistan are in jail for political reasons. There are many other languishing in jails of Baluchistan apart from those who are missing.

6 among nine political prisoners in Faisalabad are convicted by an anti terrorist court to a shame full 490 years. There crime was to lead a strike of textile workers in 2010. When a boss opened fire from a factory, workers retaliated in anger. The boss is free and workers are convicted to 490 years.

In Gilgit, when police opened fire and killed two, son and father for demanding a just compensation for all the effecties of Atta Abad Lake victims, people retaliated and occupied the area. The police officers involved in killing of two are free, however, Baba Jan, a former member of district council Gilgit, and a leading political activists of the region along 14 more are in jail. Where is the justice?

In Faisalabad, it is Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz that is after us including the provincial law minister Rana Sanaullah, who wants to teach us a lesson for building a movement of the textile workers in the city, never seen before. In Gilgit, it is Pakistan People’s Party including the chief minister Mehdi Shah who wants to teach us a lesson for siding with revolting masses of Gilgit Baltistan against injustices and malpractices.

We are not going to give up and are going to fight back by building a movement for the release of these political activists. We need your moral, financial and political support.

A Track Record of building movements

Labour Party Pakistan, established in 1997, is a small left wing political party that is helping to build the social and political movements in Pakistan. In 2000/2001, we initiated to build support for Anjaman Mozareen Punjab in Okara. The peasant movement went on to set best examples of Pakistan peasant’s history. They fought back against the military farms administration, took over 68000 acre of land and are still defiant.

In 2003/2004, we played an important role in building the power looms workers movement in the third largest city of Pakistan. Labour Qaumi Movement, whose leadership is member of LPP, led thousands of workers for better wages and labour conditions. They are now under attack.

In 2007/2008, we played a role in building the lawyers movement. All of us went to jail again and again. We were there every week with lawyer’s demonstrations and rallies, we were part of the long march and we led the famous GPO Chouck rebellion in Lahore with police.

We were one of those who opposed the military takeover of general Musharaf from day one unlike many of those who are now claiming to be champions against military establishment. Almost all LPP leadership was arrested several times during Musharaf period. For example, I was arrested 12 times during the General Musharaf dictatorship.

Building alternative media

LPP had been busy to build an alternative media to counter the influence of commercial media. LPP printed a weekly paper Mazdoor Jeddojuhd from 1997 to 2010 without any advertisement. It is now printed as a monthly magazine because of financial constraints.

Socialist Pakistan News (SPN) started in 2004, is now the largest political email list with over 7500 members. Activists of LPP work every day for over an hour to moderate this list on volunteer basis.

We are also part of the team that is producing View Point On line, one of the best read on line magazine.

Solidarity and Relief Work

LPP supporters and members have been active in 2005 earth quack and 2010 devastating rains and floods to raise funds and help those in difficult times.

We did all this to build mass workers political party to build socialist, democratic, feminist, environmentalist campaigns and movements in Pakistan, in particular, and globally, in general.

Send your donation now

We want to raise at least five hundred thousand (500,000) Rupees before 26^th November 2011. On 26^th November, LQM plan a protest public meeting in Faisalabad. We are expecting thousands to attend. We need your financial assistance to build this rally and support for the victim families who have no other mean to live on.

Urgent Finance appeal for “Faisalabad 6”

As you all are aware, six labor leaders from Faisalabad have been handed jail sentences of 490 years in total. Their only crime was to lead a peaceful strike for an increase in minimum wages as announced by the government. They are Akbar Ali Kamboh, Babar Shafiq Randhawa, Fazal Elahi, Rana Riaz Ahmed Muhammad Aslam Malik and Asghar Ali Ansari. Four of them were arrested in July 2010 while the other two were arrested in July 2011 on the same charges.

There are three more workers in jail waiting for trial to begin.

All of them are leaders of a power looms works organization called, Labour Qaumi Movement (LQM) in Faisalabad, the third largest city of Pakistan. LQM is a community based labour organization fighting for the rights of the textile workers since 2004.

An anti-terrorist court judge on November 1, 2011, sentenced six leaders under terrorism charges in Faisalabad. As is frequently observed that Terrorists are set free by these courts and workers leaders are charged under terrorist laws in Pakistan

They were accused of burning down a factory during the strike. This is a fabricated charge. The facts are that on the day of strike, July 20, 2010, gangsters in the pay of the factory owner started shooting at the workers who were leaving the factory to demand better wages. Some workers dared to go inside the factory and forced the gangsters to stop firing. Some of them were beaten up by the angry workers.

During the trial, the workers’ advocate asked if the factory had been burned down then how was it able to be operating again three days later.

More than 100,000 power loom workers in Faisalabad district went on strike on July 20, 2010, for an increase of wages that had been announced by the government during the presentation of budget 2010-11. The government announced 17 percent rise in the minimum wage for the private sector workers. The LQM in Faisalabad, Jhang and other districts had been in negotiations with power loom owners for three weeks before the strike.

The long term jail sentences of these workers leaders has been a devastating blow to the workers movement in Faisalabad, and indeed across the country. That the court could hand out such a draconian anti-labor judgment was beyond anyone’s expectations, especially since this judiciary itself had been restored through the support of a powerful people’s movement. Yet, the anti-terrorist court chose to give a verdict with the sole aim of damaging the power loom workers movement which was slowly becoming a symbol of working class militancy all over the country.

One of the principal methods of disciplining labor under capitalism is to push them to the point where they are only left with an option of negotiating with the bosses on the latter’s terms. This is done either through brute state force or by financially crushing the working class so that they only have the option of compromising in order to survive within the system.

The bosses have used the latter tactic to ensure that these labor leaders become examples for anyone who dares to raise his/her voice against the injustices meted out to the workers. All of our jailed comrades are married and were the primary breadwinners of their families. Their families have been pushed to the brink of a financial catastrophe. The families are contemplating removing children from the schools since they are unable to even buy enough groceries.

Knowing that this is part of the political strategy of the bosses to subjugate the workers, and that it is having severe consequences for the families of the jailed leaders, the Labour Party Pakistan, the Labour Qaumi Movement, the National Trade Union Federation and the Labour Education Foundation are launching a finance appeal to support the families of our jailed comrades.

These families deserve our generous support not only because these comrades are suffering due to their involvement with a working class movement. But also, because the outcome of this movement, and our ability to extend solidarity and support to our comrades in difficult conditions, will dictate whether this particular event will deter working class militancy (as wished by the bosses) or act as a shining example of working class solidarity against the hideous tactics of the ruling classes.

On behalf of the LQM, NTUF,the LPP and the LEF, we urge you to donate generously for the families of these victims of state-terrorism. These families are in dire need of financial support and we can only sustain them with a collective effort. The bank details are as follows,

DIRECT TRANSFER TO PAKISTAN

A/C Title: Labour Education Foundation

A/C Number: 01801876

Route: Please advise and pay to Citi Bank, New York, USA Swift CITI US 33 for onward transfer to BANK ALFALAH LTD., KARACHI, PAKISTAN A/C No. 36087144 and for final transfer to BANK ALFALAH LTD., LDA PLAZA, KASHMIR ROAD, LAHORE, PAKISTAN Swift: ALFHPKKALDA for A/C No. 01801876 OF LABOUR EDUCATION FOUNDATION.

THROUGH ESSF ACCOUNT

It is also possible to send checks in euro or to transfer donations through ESSF account. Specify “Pakistan” on the back of your cheques or transfer orders.

Cheques
cheques to ESSF in euros only to be sent to:
ESSF
2, rue Richard-Lenoir
93100 Montreuil
France

Bank Account:
Crédit lyonnais
Agence de la Croix-de-Chavaux (00525)
10 boulevard Chanzy
93100 Montreuil
France
ESSF, account number 445757C

International bank account details :
IBAN : FR85 3000 2005 2500 0044 5757 C12
BIC / SWIFT : CRLYFRPP
Account holder : ESSF

Jean Sanuk

While North America and Europe were hard hit, China has resisted the international crisis of 2008 thanks to a rescue plan which combined huge public spending, a low interest rate and consumption subsidies. China’s growth rate reached 9% in 2009 and 10.4% in 2010, dragging in its wake Asia and Latin America out of the crisis. It has also managed to maintain unemployment to a sustainable level. China even overtook Japan, in 2010, as the second largest economy in the world in terms of GDP and it is closing the gap with the US. On the whole, China’s rise seems unaffected by the subprime crisis. A closer look shows that real problems lie ahead. Chinese workers don’t accept overexploitation any longer. A wave of strikes spread during the summer of 2010. Workers were fighting for wage increases, improvement of working conditions and the right to organize and bargain. Inflation, especially of food products, which accelerated since the middle of 2010, is adding a new problem for workers and a concern for the government which fears a wave of discontent. On top of that, the government is doing its best to prevent any contagion from the democratic revolutions in Arabic countries. Although the overall situation in China is completely different, these democratic revolutions show to Chinese workers that it is indeed possible to topple even the worst and most powerful dictatorships.

China’s resistance to the first stage of the recession

The impact of the crisis on China and Asia, so far, has been limited (Sanuk, 2008). Asian banks were not much engaged in subprime loans and toxic products, unlike European banks. With the exception of South Korea, Asian countries did not rely on short-term capital and bank loans to finance their economies. They were not caught in a debt trap like Eastern European countries or Greece. Most of them, in particular China, had accumulated huge amount of currency reserves and were able to cope with capital flights that occurred at the end of 2008. Asian countries were primarily hit by the fall of their exports because of the slump in demand in North America and Europe. As a general rule, the recessive impact has been stronger in the most open Asian countries whose exports were concentrated in manufacturing and where the USA was an important customer. For instance, exports of manufactured products represent around 70% in Malaysia, more than 40% in Thailand and Cambodia, around 30% in China, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam, but less than 10% in India and Pakistan. These characteristics explain why the three biggest and most populated countries in Asia, China, India and Indonesia have not experienced a single quarter of recession between 2008 and 2009. The resilience of these three countries and most of all, China, which is among the biggest trade partners of Asian countries, led to a quick rebound in the second quarter of 2009 and a much stronger “V” shape recovery than in the rest of the world.

Firstly, to absorb the shock of the fall of exports, Asian countries have launched unprecedented rescue plans in the region, unlike during the “Asian crisis” of 1997-1999 when IMF sponsored structural adjustment plans worsened the crisis. The Chinese rescue plan draws the attention by its magnitude: US$ 585 billion amounting to 13.3% of GDP to be spent on a two-year span. On average, the rescue plans announced by Asian countries amounted to 7.5% of GDP against 2.8% of GDP for the G7 countries. Moreover, Asian rescue plans were more focused on public expenditure than tax cuts. On average, Asian countries dedicated 80% to increases in public spending compared with a 60% average in G20 countries. The only exception is Indonesia where tax cuts dominate. Those public expenses were accompanied by expansionary monetary policy. The median interest rate of Asian central banks has decreased by 2.25 points which is five times more than during the previous crisis. As the banking system continued to work, this had a positive impact on growth. In countries like Vietnam and China the expansionary monetary policy played a dominant role. In China, public spending has increased by a modest 26% in 2008 up from 23% in 2007, but it came back to 21% in 2009 and even 17% in 2010 when the rescue plan officially ended. On the whole, public expenses did not play a crucial role to absorb the shock. It is in fact the expansion of credit which took the lead in 2009 with a spectacular increase of 31% (see figure 2). It too fell in 2010 to -4% when the Chinese government decided to cool down the economy to prevent easy money inducing a new speculative bubble (more on this point below).

Second, household consumption remained steady as employment did not collapse during the crisis. In times of crisis, there are usually no strong increases in the unemployment rate in Asian countries, for there are no unemployment benefits except in a few countries. Workers who lost their jobs in industry try to find one in services or work as self-workers or return to the family farm whenever it is possible and when there is still one. It is especially the case in China where hundreds of thousands migrant workers went back to the interior in the winter of 2008 or stayed there after the end of the new year in February 2009. But because the economy recovered in spring 2009, a lot of them returned to the cities to find an urban job, which pays more. Thirdly, defying many sombre prognostics, Chinese exports fell from September 2008 to February 2009 but did not collapse and soon recuperated thanks to recovery in world trade. Given the high import content component of Chinese exports (about 50%) imports fell in the same proportion so that the current account stayed almost always positive although by a smaller magnitude (see figure 3). This reveals both the resilience of China to external shocks and its weakness at the same time.

The myth of Asia decoupling from the rest of the world

China’s fast trade success is due to its role as an assembly centre of components made elsewhere in Asia, mostly in Japan and South Korea and to a lesser extent in South-East Asia. The final products assembled in China are in the main destined for the rest of the world, particularly Europe and North America. To be less vulnerable to the crisis stemming from the USA and Europe, East and South-East Asia need to absorb a major and growing part of its production of final products. Although East Asian internal trade has progressed since the crisis, it has not yet reached a stage where it could cushion worldwide trade contraction. Although China has become the second economy of the world, bypassing Japan in 2010 and catching-up with the USA in terms of the absolute value of its GDP, China and the rest of Asia are still far from supplanting the USA which has the biggest markets in the world. If we take into account total Chinese population, income per capita would catch-up with the US in 25 to 50 years time, based on current assumptions. If we now only take into account the richest regions of China, most of them being located on the coast, representing 42% of the Chinese population in 2005, this catch-up could occur in just 10 to 20 years. The most optimistic hypothesis made by the Asian Development Bank shows that at the present pace, the 22 Asian countries which are classified as ‘developing Asia’, should outstrip the OECD countries’ consumption by 2030. All these predictions rest on optimistic scenarios and are far from certain given the present international crisis. To be able to decouple from the rest of the world (at least relatively, because there is no such thing as a completely autonomous region in the present global economy) Asia, and most of all China, must rebalance its economy away from export-led growth and in favour of the domestic market. This can only be achieved if three conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, China must revalue in part its exchange rate to lower the price of imports and hence the cost of goods it produces for the internal market and make exports less profitable than they are. Secondly, and most importantly, China must significantly raise the real wages of urban and rural workers so that internal consumption can recover from its present extremely low level (35% of GDP). This is the most sensitive decision because Chinese capitalists and bureaucrats are used to living like fat-cats thanks to the huge profits that state-owned and private enterprises are making on the back of overexploited workers. Thirdly, China must increase the interest rate from its present low level in order to discourage the very high investment in capital intensive industry and reorient the economy in favour of domestic services like education, health, housing, culture and leisure which are needed by the vast majority of Chinese people. These are labour intensive and could generate the millions of jobs that China requires, and they are less energy consuming and less polluting than industry. China has made some progress in this direction but is far from the objective.

Can China resist a new recession?

In 2011, the international crisis entered a second stage. The crisis in Europe is very serious and the USA is not in a much better situation. A second recession is coming and there will be a new slump in world trade. Chinese and Asian exports will be hit again and the question is whether China and Asia will be able to resist the new trade contraction with a massive rescue plan again? There are reasons to be pessimistic. China and the Asian countries cannot launch massive public expenditure or massively expand credit every two years. The last rescue plans have already created problems that are not yet resolved: in the Chinese case, a sharp increase of non-performing loans in the banking sector, inflation and speculative bubbles in real estate and in the stock exchange. Like in the USA and Europe, Chinese banks will have to be rescued with public money. And like in the USA and Europe, it is always to the workers that governments present the bill. In China, rescuing the banks and local authorities which are heavily indebted would cost a lot of money and if workers have to pay for it in one way or another, the objective of rebalancing growth in favour of domestic demand would be postponed to the long-term and with it the myth that China could drag the world out the crisis.

References

Anderson, Jonathan. 2009. “The Myth of Chinese Savings.” Far Eastern Economic Review.

Aziz, Jahangir and Cui Li. 2007. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of Household Income.” IMF Working Paper: 38. IMF: Washington DC.

Baldacci, Emanuele, Callegari Giovanni, Coady David, Ding Ding, Kumar Manmohan, TommasinoPietro, and Woo Jaejoon. 2010. “Public Expenditures on Social Programs and Household Consumption in China.” IMF Working Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department: 28. IMF: Washington DC.

Blanchard, Olivier and Giavazzi Francesco. 2005. “Rebalancing Growth in China: a Three handed Approach.” MIT Department of Economics 37. MIT: Washington D.C.

Cai, Fang and Wang Meiyan (2010). “Growth and structural changes in employment in transition China”. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 38, p 71-81.

Chandra, Sonali, Nabar Malhar, and Porter Nathan. 2010. “Corporate Savings and Rebalancing in Asia,” in Asia and Pacific. Building a Sustained Recovery. IMF ed. Washington D.C.: IMF, pp. 55-70.

Ellis, Luci and Kathryn Smith. 2007. “The global upward trend in the profit share.” BIS Working Papers Monetary and Economic Department: 29. BIS: Basle.

European, Commission. 2007. “The Labour Income Share in the European Union,” in Employment in Europe. European Commission ed. Bruxels.

Hofman, Bert and Kuijs Louis. 2008. “Rebalancing China’s Growth,” in Debating China’s Exchange Rate Policy. Morris Goldstein and Lardy Nicholas R. eds: Peterson Institute for Economics, pp. 401. IMF. 2007. “The Globalization of Labor,” in World Economic Outlook 2007. Washington D.C.: IMF.

Prasad, Eswar. 2009. “Rebalancing Growth in Asia.” Discussion Paper Series: 36. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA): Bonn.

Jha, Shikha, Prasad Eswar, and Terada-Hagiwara Akiko.2009. “Saving in Asia: Issues for Rebalancing Growth.” ADB Economics Working Paper Series: 54. Asian Development Bank: Manilla.

Prasad, Eswar. 2009. “Rebalancing Growth in Asia.” Discussion Paper Series: 36. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA): Bonn

Sanuk Jean (2008). “The Way Out of the Crisis in Asia: Rebalancing Growth Without Income Hikes?” Downloadable at Asia Left Observer: http://daniellesabai1.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/the-way-out-of-the-crisis-in-asia-rebalancing-growth-without-income-hikes/

Wiemer, Calla. 2009. “The big savers:households and government.” China Economic Quaterly, pp. 25-30.

Khalid MAHMOOD, Mian ABDUL QAYUM, Nisar SHAH and Niaz KHAN

Danielle Sabai

Bangladesh, (East Bengal before its independence in 1971) is a country with a strong tradition of struggle. Struggles of workers and peasants have always been very widespread and combative there and the Left, although weak and divided, remains powerful, with considerable mass support.

The Bangladeshi Left was profoundly marked by the international division between the Maoist and Stalinist currents. The Communist Party of East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971) itself was divided between a pro-Moscow wing and a pro-Beijing wing. These two currents took radically opposed positions during the war of liberation in 1971. The pro-Moscow current, the Bangladeshi Communist party (CPB), supported the war of liberation and the establishment of socialism in Bangladesh by the parliamentary road. This orientation led it to move closer to the Awami League [1] which came to power after the war of liberation.

The majority of the pro-Beijing wing, following Mao’s position of being opposed to the partition of Pakistan, did not support the war of liberation. It denounced it as an “Indo-Soviet machination” designed to favour Indian expansionism in the region and Soviet hegemony. The Maoist current paid a high price for going against the current in a war that was supported massively by the population. After 1971 it split into innumerable factions and was durably weakened.

During the 1970s and 1980s, a succession of military dictatorships accentuated the difficulties of development of revolutionary and radical parties, reinforcing tendencies towards division. Today the Bangladeshi Left is divided into two distinct blocs. Parties like the CPB and the Workers’ Party have chosen to collaborate with the Awami League when it is in power [2].

Outside the circles that are close to the government, some left parties sought to overcome their divisions by launching in September 2007 a national coalition, the Democratic Left Alliance, with the objective of fighting for a democratic Bangladesh and for the emergence of a credible opposition to the two principal parties which alternate in government [3]. This alliance, which consists of ten parties of the radical Left, is clearly in opposition to the political parties of the Establishment but also in opposition to the left parties which take part in government. Discussions are underway to reinforce the alliance and widen it to other opposition forces [4]. Although the parties forming the coalition can have appreciably different ideas, they agree on a minimum program which enables them to intervene on the political scene on a national level.

On the ground, in spite of its divisions and its numerical weakness, the radical Bangladeshi Left remains strong. Thanks to a long tradition of struggle, it has won mass support among workers and peasants. Most of the political parties of the radical Left have built mass organizations which have made possible the development of spectacular struggles, with significant results. For example, the CPB-ML leads the Krishok and Kishani Sabha federations, two peasant organizations which represent Via Campesina in Bangladesh and have two million members. Several political parties, such as the Revolutionary Workers’ Party and the Revolutionary Democratic Party, have built trade unions in the textile industry. The parties of the radical Left have also developed work and built mass organizations aimed at students and women.

We find those mass organisations and trade unions in many of the struggles which have developed in recent years and which have met with a certain echo at the international level. In 2010 several strike waves broke out in the textile industry. This sector accounts for 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s exports and employs more than three million people. The workers, mainly women, work for starvation wages in medieval conditions for Western customers, who order large quantities of textiles at low prices. Between 19 and 23 June, 2010, 800,000 workers stopped work to demand a wage increase. In July and August, nearly 700 factories were affected by strike waves, always on the question of wages. In December, new mobilizations took place to obtain the payment of the wage increase that had been won in August and had still not been paid by November. Mobilizations are severely repressed by the riot police and it is not rare for workers to be killed during them. But in spite of the repression and the intimidation of trade-union activists, the struggles remain very strong.

Other struggles, just as significant, have developed, in particular on environmental questions. For example, in the district of Phulbari, the local communities have mobilized against a project for an opencast coal mine by a company based in England, GMC Resources plc, supported by pension funds and private banking. If this project materialised, 500,000 people could be displaced and the effect on the environment would be very damaging. The mobilization has been supported by the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources and Ports (NCPOGMRP), a collective consisting of experts, researchers, political parties and individuals. This collective constitutes “a new form of socio-political movement with its working experience on national interest, especially against bad deals with the MNCs”[5]. The movement in Phulbari is unprecedented, both in the extent of the revolt and the consciousness that it has developed in the local communities. So far, it has succeeded in preventing the implementation of this project.

Peasant struggles are also particularly important. In Bangladesh, 80 per cent of the population works in the agricultural sector and 70 per cent of peasants are landless. The Krishok and Kishani Sabha federations have led big struggles for the peasants to have access to land, in particular by organizing land occupations. Since the 2000 decade, these organizations have also developed the mobilization of peasants on the questions of climate change and food sovereignty, two fundamental questions for Bangladesh, which is already affected by global warming.

Translated from French for IVP

Notes

[1] The Awami League was in the forefront of the struggle for the independence of Bangladesh. The principal pillars of the party’s ideology are secularism, nationalism, socialism and democracy. In fact, the Awami League has evolved towards the centre and has actively implemented the liberal policies dictated by international organizations like the World, Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank.

[2] Although the Awami League has again been in power since the 2009 elections, the CPB is now in opposition. It has been replaced by the Workers’ Party, which has allied itself with the Awami League by participating in a 14-party coalition.

[3] The Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. These two parties carry out the same neoliberal policies. The difference lies in the alliances that are made. The BNP is allied to Islamist parties, whereas the Awami League has agreements with secular parties, including the CPB and the Workers’ Party.

[4] The alliance is made up of: the Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal (BSD)- the Bangladesh Socialist Party – which is a split from the Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), one of the parties of the governing coalition; the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB-ML), a split from the Communist Party of Pakistan, formed in 1976; the Revolutionary Workers’ Party, a split from the Workers’ Party, the latter being at present part of the governing coalition; the Democratic Revolutionary Party, founded by the fusion between the Biplobi Oikya Front (which comes from the CPB-ML) and an underground party, the Shramajibi Mukti Andolon; the Ganosanghati Andolon, a current that comes from the Jatio Mukti Council, a split from the CPB-ML; the Jatiya Ganofront; the Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal (Mahbub), a faction of the BSD; the Bangladesher Samajtantrik Andolon; the Bangladesher Workers’ Party (Pumargathito), another faction of the Workers’ Party, which has recently joined the Democratic Left Alliance; and the Ganotantrik Majdur Party.

[5]`Development’, Capitalism, NGOs and People’s Movements in Bangladesh: an Interview with Anu Muhammad

Danielle Sabai

Three months after the elections which gave her a crushing victory, Yingluck Shinawatra [1], the leader of the Puea Thai party and the first woman Prime Minister of Thailand, has had to face the worst floods since 1942. Since the beginning of the monsoon in late July, around two and a half million people have been affected by the floods in 28 provinces in the North and Centre of the country. More than 400 people have died and thousands of others have fallen ill.

A return to normality is likely to take at least 6 weeks. Efforts are now concentrated on avoiding flooding in the centre of the capital, Bangkok, whose economic weight represents more than 40% of Thailand’s GDP. The city is completely encircled by water and the authorities face a conjuncture of heavy rains, a high tide preventing the flow of the water towards the sea and the massive arrival of water from the North and centre of the flooded country.

Bangkok has been protected by huge sandbag walls to the detriment of the neighbouring provinces and the modest populations who live there. Inside this belt, the water cannot flow towards the sea. It can reach heights of more than one metre, submerging the surrounding houses. The tensions and resentment are palpable and the army has been deployed to protect the makeshift dykes.

The government has been subject to severe criticism for the tardy implementation of aid deemed to be relatively ineffective. Beyond this crisis, it is the management of water as a whole which has to be reviewed. The department of irrigation of the hydrology and water management office has for several months maintained very high water levels on the dams on the Ping and Nan rivers which flow into the Chao Phraya river which traverses Bangkok. The water contained had to be released at the worst time accentuating the floods upstream and worsening the situation around the capital.

The material damage is very considerable and the economic consequences are already being felt. Houses and infrastructures have been destroyed or damaged in their hundreds of thousands. Large area of the central plain, the rice bowl of Thailand, have been submerged by flooding, destroying 10 % of the harvest of the world’s biggest rice exporter. Several economic zones have also been flooded affecting more than 10,000 factories, some having to close. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are threatened and with them the income of millions of persons.

The Thai economy is not alone in being affected by the floods. Thailand produces raw materials and components supplying the manufacturing production chains of other countries where they are used to manufacture finished products. This is for example the case in micro computing and cars. 60% of hard disks come from Thailand and their scarcity has led to price increases on the international markets. The car industry represents 12% of GDP and employs 300,000 persons. Most of the big constructors, assemblers and parts and components manufacturers are present in Thailand. The halting of production in some factories leads to disruption of the production chains of other countries. Thus Honda has already announced a slowdown of its production in Canada and the USA and Toyota has done the same in Japan. This could also be the case with China, the main destination for Thai exports.

According to the first predictions, which did not include possible damage in the centre of Bangkok, the cost of the floods could be as high as four billion dollars and represent 1 to 1.5 % of GDP. With an economy in downturn, tax income is at its lowest. This natural disaster with huge social and economic consequences could in the long term have an impact on the economic policy and social measures proposed by the Puea Thai in favour of its popular electoral base during the election campaign.

For now, the government has just approved an extension of the budget deficit of 50 billion baths for the new fiscal year which begins on October 1st, bringing it to 400 billion baths (9.5 billion euros). All state bodies and ministries have also been asked to reduce by 10% their expenditure so as to find 80 billion baths (1.9 billion euros) to finance aid and reconstruction. Finally, the government may turn to multilateral bodies to borrow several hundred billion baths.

Among the key measures of the electoral campaign, the Puea Thai undertook to increase the minimum daily income to 300 baths (7 euros) for everyone as of January 1, 2012. Currently there is no minimum wage on a national scale but rather a minimum wage in each province which oscillates between 159 (3.75 euros) and 221 (5.20 euros) baths per day.

The minimum wage in Thailand is determined and implemented by a tripartite commission made up of 15 members – five representatives each for the state, the employers and employees. In mid -October an agreement was reached between the representatives of the employees and the state, against the wishes of the employers. The minimum wage would be increased by 40% at the national scale as of April 1, which would bring it to around 300 baths in Bangkok and in six provinces where it is already very high. In the other 77 provinces, it will remain then below the level of 300 baths promised during the election campaign but should gradually increase to 300 baths over three or four years.

In imposing a substantial increase in the daily minimum wage against the advice of industrialists already affected by the floods, the government has sent a strong signal to its electoral base, made up mainly of workers and peasants. The small and medium enterprises will be the most affected by the wage increase. But if one looks at the decade as a whole, the minimum wage increase has only exceeded the inflation rate twice, in 2001 and 2007, and globally it has at best stagnated.

The daily minimum wage increase is presented by its detractors as a populist measure. But a substantial increased should help reduce the deep social inequalities which divide Thailand, one of the most inegalitarian countries in Asia. That could be a first step towards reviving Thai internal consumption, which is too low, and thus to counterbalance a dependency on exports which currently represent 60 % of GDP.

During the election campaign the Puea Thai advanced other economic measures favouring the poorest layers who compose the majority of the population, such as allowing borrowers to suspend the repayment of their debt for three years, guaranteeing the price of rice, indexing the repayment of loans granted by the state to students to their incomes, and fixing again at 30 baths the price of universal cover for medical care. The implementation of such measures would in the medium term partially transform the socio-economic structure of Thailand.

The crisis provoked by the floods will be a real political test. If it wishes to keep its campaign promises and engage on a programme of post flood reconstruction benefitting the majority, the government will have to implement a courageous tax policy seeking the money where it is, in the first place among the Thai millionaires and the royal family and by drastically reducing the budget of the army which has exploded since the military coup of 2006. That involves confronting the élites who are not disposed to pay for a policy which would benefit the broad masses.

Finally, even if reconstruction would undoubtedly constitute the main task of the government in the coming months, it must also meet the aspirations to democracy, social justice and the political and social changes that the Red Shirts have forcefully demanded in recent years. Can the government meet these expectations?

NOTES

[1] the younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, businessman and politician overthrown by a military coup in September 2006

15 October Action

On the global day of action against capitalism, October 15, there were more than 300 people took part in the city centre of Hong Kong to protest against the failure of the system. A wide range of groups and parties joined the event, including Left 21, FM101, student organisations, Anti-nuclear coalition, Lehman Brothers victims, LSD (Link of Social Democrates), People’s Power, Neighborhood and Workers Service Centre etc. A group of young men wearing “V” mask and black clothes was also present.

Throughout the afternoon there was a forum, where groups and individuals took the floor in turn. Left 21 members attacked capitalism for bringing the disparity of wealth because it only cares about profit. In Hong Kong a handful of rich people monopolize the wealth of the people so the latter can only earn subsistence wages. The anti-nuclear alliance activist Man Si Wei pointed out that the nuclear power industry was nurtured by the nuclear industry in order to make money. The nuclear industry colluded with the government and the United Nations in fooling the public over the issue of the so called safety level of the amount of radiation absorbed by the body, which does not have real scientific basis. The Japanese government, after the disaster in Fukushima, raised the safety level arbitrarily proved this. Lam Chi Leung from Pioneer pointed out that global capitalism has become a big casino. Huge amounts of social resources are concentrated in the hands of a few large financial groups, while public medical care, education and social welfare are denied the necessary funding. He called for the overthrowing of the regime of the rich to make way for a government of the working people to fix the problem.

In the late afternoon the forum was adjoined, and all participants marched to the headquarter of the HSBC to continue the assembly and occupation. After the demonstrators arrived at the HSBC headquarters, the police warned demonstrators that their assembly was illegal, and the demonstrators responded with boo. Eventually they were left untouched by the police. There are dozens of protesters who camped at the site overnight and are now still ongoing when this report is made.

Qalandar Bux Memon et Ali Mohsni

The Pakistani Left has a history to be proud of and is regrouping to fight in new battles, as Qualandar Bux Memon and Ali Mohsni report.

Pierre Rousset

A solidarity campaign is underway (see below the statement) in defence of Baba Jan, a leader of the LPP – the Labour Party Pakistan – and other people imprisoned in the region of Gilgit-Baltistan, in the north of Pakistan. Baba Jan, according to information from the LPP, was tortured for two days by the secret service.